"Man, as an ethical integer, is free to choose between good and bad courses within the limits of his circumstances, or he is not. If he is not free, if he can only accept what is handed to him from above (by fate, or by decree of the human agents of fate), then there is not much use in talking about morality or ethics. To make any sense of the idea of morality, it must be presumed that the human being is responsible for his actions--and the responsibility cannot be understood apart from the presumption of freedom of choice."
--John Chamberlain, The Roots of Capitalism, 1959

A good quote. Haven't read the book, however. What exactly is his thesis about the roots of capitalism?

Immanuel Kant summed it up more succinctly, "A 'you ought' implies a 'you can'"

I'm sure Skeptic will accuse me of grasping and hubris for merely for raising a question, nevertheless....

Is this necessarily the case? Consider a dog conditioned to be savage. If that dog attacks and maims a child, for example, we destroy it? That is, we hold it responsible for the attack. Did the dog make a free choice? I don't think so. But we punish it all the same.

Ralph,

My two cents: the "punishment" in your example is at best an-alogous to the punishment administered to humans. Our holding the dog "responsible" is more akin to the way we hold bacteria responsible for infections, say. Our killing bacteria in order to prevent future infections is predicated on our recognizing the causal efficacy of bacteria, but our action doesn't rise to the level of bacteria-punishment. Similarly, our killing the dog is just a reasonable measure taken to prevent future trouble. Moreover, in such a case, the only agent who is conceivably accountable, and hence properly punishable, is the person who conditioned the dog in the first place (if there is such a person). So, I don't think yours is an effective counterexample.

We aren't punishing the dog for a moral action. We are removing it because it is an inconvenience and a danger.

Animals, unlike humans, do not have free will or moral accountability. At least, not in any way like we do.

Buzz: Is the line separating dog and man here fine or blurred? Could a man be conditioned to be savage, etc. (Isn't there a really bad movie along these lines starring Jet Li), so that he would attack as a result of training and not by choice? Would the 'punishment' of such a man be an-alogous to normal punishment? It seems to me that the dichotomy 'determined/free' needs refinement along a continuum.

Ben: I've always been perplexed by libertarian conceptions of free will.

Ralph,

Let me point out a possible extension of your "determined/free will continuum." Even if we assume it in general is true, we should, in nearly every case assume any particular person is strongly on the free will side. This assumption treats the individual as a full human being and not as an animal.

There is another reason for this assumption since there is a strong tendency for the assumption to become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Acting freely may be a habit-forming exercise that we should encourage. Telling them people maybe they can't do it (they may not have free will) could be quite discouraging.

"Ben: I've always been perplexed by libertarian conceptions of free will." - Ralph

In what way? But yes, of course a man could be conditioned to behave like a dog. Morality is an inherently social concept.

P.S: And of course, we could remove a savage man that was a threat without thinking that he was engaging in a moral action by attacking us, if he was truly an animalistic beast, as our hypothetical creature is.

Ralph,

First, let us agree that the conditioning scenario supposes at least two parties, the conditioner and the conditionee. Now, To the extent that a man could be so conditioned, wouldn't it have to be in direct proportion to the loss of his rationality? To attack and kill on command is to operate in the manner of a machine, not through deliberation and hence choice. So, if (*) it were possible to condition a man to attack and kill on command, such a conditioned man would be more brutish and less human, and any punishment administered would thus be an-alogous to normal punishment. Moreover, moral culpability is the conditioner's, not the conditionee's.

(*) This is a big if, I think. Can reason be lost, corroded, erased, etc.? I guess so, but this would be an extremenly pathological situation.

Of course, I agree that you're on to something when you suggest that the determined/free dichotomy needs to be expanded along a continuum. Certainly there are actions that fall in the grey area in between the poles. As a student of Aristotle, you know that he extends voluntary action to children and animals, who lack fully formed reason but who nonetheless are capable of acting through some degree of cognition and desire, i.e., not absolutely deterministically. There are also those actions we make without perfect information and/or in compromised emotional states. I think these too fall somewhere in between.

Of course they don't. If free will refers only to decisions made in perfect tranquility, then it means nothing at all.

Careful. I'm not saying that free will refers only to decisions made in perfect tranquility.

(1) To set up a continuum with "free" at one end and "determined" at the other is not necessarily to imply that anything and everything short of the "free" end is in fact not free. Indeed, the whole point of a continuum is to capture the shades of grey, not to box things into exclusive categories.

(2) There are, arguably, "grades" of freedom. For example, a distinction can be made between (a) the capacity to know first and to act on the basis of that knowledge, and (b) the capacity simply to choose arbitrarily among a set of options.

(3) If we say (a) is "absolute freedom" or "true freedom"--i.e. the "free" pole of the continuum--and (b) is something less, we have set up the basis for a continuum.

(4) Actions performed not in perfect tranquility--in ignorance or through undue influence of passions (e.g. tiredness or other physiological impediment) seem to me also to fall somewhere "below" (a). They are genuinely different.

(5) Yet we may still consider these types of actions to be generically "free"--i.e. committed through some exercise of deliberation and choice, and not exclusively through some extrinsic determining principle(s).

(6) But note that freedom is now understood as a genus, some of the species of which have similarities to determined actions insofar as these types of actions come to be, in part, through the causality of nonrational principles.

Again, I'm not saying free will refers only to decisions made in perfect tranquility. What I am saying, rather, is that it's possible for free will to execute different sorts of actions, some fully reasoned and others less so--and perhaps influenced by some of the same factors that bring about fully determined actions.

Buzz,

Would it have to involve a loss in rationality. Let me change the example. I watched a documentary on the KKK a few months ago. Two children were interviewed, and they expressed commitments to violent racism. When those children become adults, they will likely pursue those ends that have been given to them by their parents, and perhaps they will be extremely clever in their pursuit. On Aristotle's account, they will deliberate effectively, and therefore exercise their rationality. They will also 'choose' the means to achieve those ends. In that sense, their actions are voluntary, but it seems to me that they are not free in any sort of strong Augustinian sense. They can no more choose different ends than I can choose not to believe in God, etc.

This has always bothered me about Aristotle's account. If we do not choose ends, and the end necessitates the deliberative process and the choices that follow, how can anyone be held responsible for their actions (that's the question Chamberlain would ask); or to turn it around, what has libertarian freedom to do with culpability? We are all compelled to seek the ends we've been given; nevertheless, those who pursue bad ends should be punished. Why? Because bad ends are bad. Why is any further explanation necessary?

The practical works are not my forte. What do you think? Perhaps Skeptic could join the discussion.

I did have Book III of the Ethics vaguely in mind.

The only end which is an end in itself is the ultimate end, happiness, eudaimonia. Strictly speaking, this is the only one we are "given." All other ends are also means, intermediates, subordinate and deliberatively chosen for the sake of the ultimate end. This is the extent of the "necessity" of the deliberative process that is imposed by the end--our will cannot but desire and pursue our happiness.

Any "bad ends" are necessarily intermediate ends that we opt for on our way to happiness. It is up to us (enter freedom, responsibility, culpability, etc.) to use our natural human equipment to develop the moral and intellectual virtues to discern which of these intermediates will best promote our happiness. To the extent that a vicious upbringing stunts the development of our virtues and discernment, our culpability is deferred. However, no normal adult is invincibly ignorant of the first principles of the natural law or of the inferences easily drawn therefrom. This is the key point, I think. Even a former KKK kid will know that violent racism is wrong, in spite of his upbringing, so long as his reason is functional--if it's not, then we have the compromised rationality and brutishness I was talking about earlier.

So, yes, we're compelled to pursue the one end we've been given, happiness, but beyond that we are free, and responsible, to determine which among myriad intermediate ends will best promote happiness. All sorts of intermediate ends, good and bad, appeal to our will as things that might promote happiness. It is reason's job to scrutinize the possibilities and present the best option to our will. Those who are culpable for pursuing bad ends have either failed to employ reason or have opted for an end that reason has nixed. In either case, it is for acting irrationally, either without or against reason, that they are blamed.

Buzz,

I think any definition of freedom in that manner becomes extremely pernicious. Rather, I would simply say a free action is any action taken by a human not under threat of physical coercion.

However, I don't think the problem here is defining what is "free". Rather, our issue is defining what is "human". Is Jet Li's character in the film truly a human? In what sense is he fully human if he lacks a human's cognitive ability and moral sense? He is certainly without what Aquinas would call the "divine spark".

Damn, hit the post button by accident.

Ralph,

I disagree that the children of the KKK could not choose to be racist. I also disagree that you could not choose to disbelieve in God. Those are two things which are well within the realm of possibility. Chances are that if you bombarded yourself with enough atheist literature and ideas for a long enough amount of time, you would see your faith fall away. The same goes for the racist children in question.

Of course, I would not advise this.

Buzz,

In what sense does the bad man 'opt' for bad ends? Stricly speaking, the only object of choice in the Aristotelian scheme is the final step that is identified by deliberation and is in the actor's immeidate power to bring about. The idea of freedom that is central to Chamberlain's comment is absent. The choice is a necessary result of deliberation.

Granted that happiness is the only end in itself. And so in an absolute sense, it is the only end that is given. But there are many other ends that are given in a weaker sense (though perhaps strong enough for the point I am attempting to make). They are given in the formative years of the person. How is a person to determine whether a bad end instilled in them is a means to happiness? Deliberation. Doesn't that sort of deliberation require a fairly developed rational faculty? Say, one capable of philosophy. Isn't this the point where Aristotle is usually faulted for setting the bar too high? If so, then for all intents and purposes, the bad ends that were taught from childhood are as given as the highest end. For the chance that bad men will become philosophers is remote.

Ben,

I agree that I could become an atheist. And I can imagine circumstances that might bring about that result. Perhaps I could make choices to effect those circumstances, but atheism may or may not result. I cannot at any stage of simply elect to be an atheist. I cannot choose to believe that there is not God in the sense that I can choose to leave the room. Nor can I choose to like spinach or NASCAR, etc. My choices are constrained in many ways.

'Rather, I would simply say a free action is any action taken by a human not under threat of physical coercion.'

This is too weak in that it is consistent with determinism.

Chamberlain's point concerns freedom, even libertarian freedom. Unless the will is ultimately without constraint, culpability, and therefore, does not exist.

I understand what you mean about God, now. You are correct, but I do not see what bearing it has on your free will. Presumably at some point you were faced with the question "Does God exist?" and you (rightly) calculated that He does. That some choices have long term and binding effects has no bearing on whether they were made freely.

Though you talk about "libertarian free will". It is possible that a libertarian in the Randian tradition would feel free will was the center piece of their philosophy. I do not know, I am not a Randian, but a Misesian. A Misesian would talk about "Human Action." He would derive that "humans act." He would then derive that "Humans always act towards their greatest perceived happiness." We know this is true, because in any scenario where action is taken, the human took the course that he did take over any other possible course of action. So then, he would conclude that if your goal is to maximize human happiness, the answer is to minimize restrictions upon human action. Through acting, humans would take care of the rest on their own. I think you specifically would be surprised to learn that most Misesians (myself included) are culturally conservative, and feel that a libertarian society would be a culturally conservative society. In any event, once you have established these aspects of human action, whether they were truly freely chosen, on an abstract level, becomes irrelevant.

You will have to elaborate on how this compliments determinism.

'Presumably at some point you were faced with the question "Does God exist?" and you (rightly) calculated that He does.'

I have considered various arguments for and against the existence of God, but merely as an academic exercise. I have never 'calculated' that God exists. I believe it and I always have. My belief does not depend on any calculation; indeed, it may not be necessary or even possible to justify a belief in God (Alvin Plantinga, a philosopher at Norte Dame, argues that such beliefs are 'properly basic'). My belief was given to me. And that's the reason I brought it up. A person usually has such beliefs, i.e., beliefs that are present from the beginning and are not subject to free choice.

The expression 'libertarian free will' does not have anything in particular to do with the 'libertarianism' of Rand or Mises or Mill, etc. It refers to a particular view of the will which originates with Augustine, viz., that the will is not constrained in any way. That's not to say that one can choose to make a square circle or to fly. There are, of course, different sorts of constraints on what is possible. However, a libertarian with respect to the will holds that a person can choose any alternative that is logically and physically possible.

Just to bring this discussion back to where it started, Chamberlain writes: '[moral] responsibility cannot be understood apart from the presumption of freedom of choice.' This is what I'm attempting to quibble with. That is, I'm attempting to see if moral responsibility can be made sense of apart from (libertarian) freedom.

Ben,

I don't quite understand what's pernicious about such an understanding of free will. Is is not true that some executions of of free will are done well (i.e., through the proper influence of reason) and others done poorly (i.e., without due consideration to reason’s rule, and through the influence of other nonrational factors)?

And, if you want to define free action as “any action taken by a human not under threat of physical coercion,” what about the following case: a human who opts to be tortured and killed rather than give in to his torturers and killers? Is the absence of physical coercion a necessary condition for free action? Surely physical coercion is in play here, but not free action? Shouldn't a definition of free will be centered on the person as an intrinsic principle of action, and not on his extrinsic circumstances?

I certainly agree with your suggestion that the Jet Li character is likely not properly human.

Ralph,

How do we opt for bad ends? You're right; strictly speaking, the object of choice is what the agent opts for here and now—i.e., it is the final step arrived at in the process of deliberation. However, the intermediate ends, insofar as they too are not ultimate, and hence also means, are deliberatively arrived at as means to the ultimate end, happiness. Moreover, it is these intermediates that may in fact be bad. If and when they are bad, yet chosen, this is because of some failing of the agent with respect to his reason, as I described before:

“All sorts of intermediate ends, good and bad, appeal to our will as things that might promote happiness. It is reason's job to scrutinize the possibilities and present the best option to our will. Those who are culpable for pursuing bad ends have either failed to employ reason or have opted for an end that reason has nixed. In either case, it is for acting irrationally, either without or against reason, that they are blamed.”

Your other central question: “…But there are many other ends that are given in a weaker sense (though perhaps strong enough for the point I am attempting to make). They are given in the formative years of the person. How is a person to determine whether a bad end instilled in them is a means to happiness? Deliberation. Doesn't that sort of deliberation require a fairly developed rational faculty?…”

To this I respond, maybe, I guess. It is our natural rational capacity to know the natural law must kick in, and we need to be mature enough to consider it and abide by it:

“…[N]o normal adult is invincibly ignorant of the first principles of the natural law or of the inferences easily drawn therefrom. This is the key point, I think. Even a former KKK kid will know that violent racism is wrong, in spite of his upbringing, so long as his reason is functional--if it's not, then we have the compromised rationality and brutishness I was talking about earlier.”

So, the opting for bad ends follows from willful neglect or rejection of what reason is capable of revealing as right and wrong courses of action, i.e., as intermediate ends that.

I apologize for repeatedly repeating myself. Not sure if this is ever helpgul. Maybe you’re right and this position is indeed setting the bar too high. I happen to think it’s not, as I don’t think philosophers are the only ones who know the very basics of right and wrong, i.e. the first principles of natural law, etc. Granted, this is a point of dispute.

And thanks for bringing the discussion back to where it started. "...I'm attempting to see if moral responsibility can be made sense of apart from (libertarian) freedom." Is this really all that complicated? Isn't it just a point of common sense: we punish or praise a man's actions only if he is the principle of those actions? We don't praise or blame a person for what fate or fortune or his parents endow him with, we praise or blame him for what he does with those assets (or liabilities). Will you tell me it is otherwise? Would anything otherwise make sense? Common sense says "no." I don't know, but I'm inclined to think that at the end of the day common sense trumps quibbling over the details of test cases. There's always room for nitpicking with philosophical an-alysis such as we've been doing. The real question, though, is, can you do battle with common sense?

Buzz,

I certainly will not tell it otherwise. A man is the principle of his own actions, and for that reason we rightly praise or blame him for what he does. This is common sense and I do not wish to abandon it. I do, however, wish to interpret it (or see if it can be interpreted) in the light of a certain philosophical concern.

I worry about the conception of the will that seems implicit in Chamberlain's comment, namely, that the 'movements' of the will are uncaused. Common sense tells us that a man is the cause of his own actions, and therefore, that he is responsible for them. Is a strong view of freedom (a view that is philosophical in origin) a necessary condition for our common sense intuitions about action?

Sorry for taking so long to post a reply, I was in NYC for the weekend, without access to a computer.

"I have considered various arguments for and against the existence of God, but merely as an academic exercise. I have never 'calculated' that God exists. I believe it and I always have. My belief does not depend on any calculation; indeed, it may not be necessary or even possible to justify a belief in God (Alvin Plantinga, a philosopher at Norte Dame, argues that such beliefs are 'properly basic'). My belief was given to me. And that's the reason I brought it up. A person usually has such beliefs, i.e., beliefs that are present from the beginning and are not subject to free choice." -Ralph

But they are. They were given to you, and you accepted them. You had the option of choosing not to accept them, I know this from first hand experience. I was raised in a Catholic home, and from the time of my very early childhood I was an adamant atheist. I have since returned to the Church, though not from the influence of my family. Faith was "given" to me and I rejected it, so free will plays a role. Most people choose to accept the religion of their fathers. That some people do not is evidence enough that it is a freely made choice.

"The expression 'libertarian free will' does not have anything in particular to do with the 'libertarianism' of Rand or Mises or Mill, etc. It refers to a particular view of the will which originates with Augustine, viz., that the will is not constrained in any way. That's not to say that one can choose to make a square circle or to fly. There are, of course, different sorts of constraints on what is possible. However, a libertarian with respect to the will holds that a person can choose any alternative that is logically and physically possible." -Ralph

Presumably yes, they would be capable of doing so. I cannot think of any scenario where they could not. To say that a belief was not freely chosen because it was inherited is like saying that a good was not freely purchased because it was advertised.

P.S: J.S Mill wasn't a libertarian, though that is a common mistake. He advocated many government programs, such as public schools.